

**Advance Questions for Admiral Vernon E. Clark, USN**  
**Nominee for the Position of Chief of Naval Operations**  
**1 July 2004**

**Defense Reforms**

**You previously have answered the Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your original nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations.**

**Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing on May 16, 2000?**

A. Yes, my views have changed. I believe, more strongly than ever before, in the importance of this joint legislation. As I stated at the time of my first confirmation hearing, I believe that these reforms have helped to significantly improve the effectiveness of our joint warfighting forces. Our military is much more capable as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.

**Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

A. No legislation, especially when it fundamentally changes institutions, can predict perfectly how reforms will be implemented. So, I believe the time has come to conduct a review of certain aspects of the Act.

Most pressing is the need to review how acquisition is accomplished within the DoD. We need to focus on how we can develop systems that are "born joint." Command and control systems, for example, is one area where we can do better. And, we are not making sufficient progress in leveraging the buying power of something as big as DoD. Among the greatest risks facing us is the spiraling cost of the procurement of modern military systems. Additionally, implementation of the Act's provisions giving "sole responsibility" for acquisition to the Service Secretaries has effectively cut the Service Chiefs out of the acquisition process. The voice of the Service Chiefs in this process should be enhanced.

We have made great progress in developing joint perspectives. It is now time to examine joint educational requirements, joint billet structure and joint service credit to ensure we are best postured, from a statutory point of view, for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Secretary of Defense and with the Secretary of the Navy to continue to evaluate this law and make recommendations to improve our joint forces.

## **Duties**

**What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Chief of Naval Operations, as set forth in title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy pertaining to functions of the Chief of Naval Operations?**

A. I am comfortable with the duties and functions of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as delineated in the above regulations, and I recommend no changes.

## **Relationships**

**Please identify any changes you have observed since your last confirmation in the relationships between the CNO and the following officials.**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

A. Secretary Rumsfeld has created an operating environment where there is significant senior executive exchange, the focus of which is the Senior Level Review Group (SLRG). This increased level of senior executive communication is generally oriented to broader DoD issues rather than those that are service-specific.

Secretary Rumsfeld is also deeply involved in the selection of future military leaders, and that has changed our interface as well as the process for nominating three and four-star officers.

### **The Deputy Secretary of Defense.**

A. The Deputy Secretary continues to function as the number two in the Department. In the post 9/11 environment especially, my exchanges with him have become more policy oriented and less program/budget focused. My primary interface is through the SLRG.

### **The Under Secretaries of Defense and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.**

A. The advent of the SLRG has given the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense more opportunity to set the agenda. Their impact, and the breadth of their authority, has therefore increased.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

A. The Chairman's involvement with the SECDEF, not just day-to-day, but hour-to-hour, has increased. While this is to be expected in time of war, it is also due to the Chairman's focus becoming more and more operational in nature.

### **The Combatant Commanders**

A. I see more interchange between the Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs. Combatant Commander Conferences, for example, now meet three times per year rather than twice in order to enhance our exchange and maintain the DoD-wide focus on transformation and the Global War on Terrorism.

## **The Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy**

A. The relationship between the Secretary of the Navy and the OPNAV staff has changed markedly. SECNAV significantly streamlined his own staff, and we have established a much more collaborative environment within the DoN that has transformed the way work is accomplished. The Assistant Secretaries have direct access to my Deputy CNOs and their working relationships have changed for the better. My three-star Flag Officers now work more directly with the Assistant Secretaries and this has also enhanced staff coordination. These arrangements have created a vastly improved environment of teamwork and the Department functions much more effectively as a result. The Under Secretary position is not filled.

## **The General Counsel of the Navy**

A. No change.

## **The Commandant of the Marine Corps**

A. The Commandant and I have created a Navy/Marine Corps Board of Directors, which functions at the three-star level, and we formalized additional structures to improve the interface between the services. We created a "Big Four" (CMC, CNO, VCNO and ACMC) and a "Big 12" (Big Four plus other key three-star officers) which now provide a framework for senior level interface that never existed before. In addition, there are now Marine Corps general officers in virtually every corporate-level meeting that I conduct, including all of my budget and program meetings. While we remain two services, the cooperation is greater than I've ever known it to be. This has led to a new level of co-development and is what the nation deserves. The Marine Corps is our number one joint partner and we are seeking to run the headquarters in a way that proves it.

The Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I have a tremendous partnership as we work together to revolutionize the warfighting capability of the Navy - Marine Corps team.

## **The Chiefs of Staff of the other Services**

The Service Chiefs are now individually and collectively pursuing joint solutions more aggressively. Our focus is more on joint program development and less on current operations in formal settings like the SLRG and the Tank, in bilateral service

warfighter talks, and in acquisition. This is the most joint group of Chiefs we have had to date, and this progression to more "jointness" should be expected as we grow officers who have been "born joint" at junior levels.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to foster the same strong relationships with leadership across the Department of Defense.

## **Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront if confirmed for a second term of office as CNO?**

- A. The major challenges that I would face if confirmed for a second term are those that I have testified to this year, specifically:
- Winning the ongoing battle to attract, develop and retain the most talented men and women that our nation has to offer.
  - Delivering the right readiness at the right cost to support the nation's warfighting needs.
  - Solving the investment challenge to create the future capabilities and the vision outlined in Sea Power 21 to recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to operate as an effective component of our joint warfighting team.
  - Creating, formalizing and executing ideas that will improve our productivity and reduce our overhead costs.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

A. If confirmed, the first item on my agenda will be the development of a Human Capital Strategy that makes sense for the Navy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As I testified earlier this year, we will continue to pursue the kinds of new technologies and competitive personnel policies that will streamline both combat and non-combat personnel positions, improve the two-way integration of active and reserve missions, and reduce the Navy's total manpower structure. As you know, we have proposed a FY05 Navy end strength reduction of 7,900 personnel, and I believe that that is just the beginning. Your Navy is fundamentally different from the other services in that the combat power of fleet units is not directly proportional to the size of the crew. And it will be even less so in the future as we integrate new technologies and implement transformational concepts of operation. In short, we expect to be a better educated and trained, but smaller workforce in the future. Getting there will likely require changes in the way we recruit, assess, train and manage that workforce. It will, therefore, also require some flexible authorities and incentive tools to shape career paths and our skills mix in a way that lets us compete for the right talent in a competitive marketplace.

On the issue of readiness, with the help of the Congress we now have the most combat-ready fleet that I've seen in my career. Our people are superbly trained and well provisioned. They are ready for combat operations earlier in their training and maintenance cycle and they remain so for a longer period of time. This has been made possible by the ongoing transformation of training and maintenance concepts. If confirmed, my challenge will be to continue to refine our understanding of the collective contributions of all the components of readiness, to accurately define the requirements, and to align the proper funding and provide a balanced investment to the right accounts. To that end, we will continue to advance the Integrated Readiness Capability Assessment (IRCA) process that I testified to this year.

I also intend to pursue a broad analytical agenda in order to maximize our understanding of the data and assumptions that are the foundation of our campaign analysis and budget request formulation. As part of that work, we have already invested in improvements to our modeling and simulation capabilities, and we have modified our analytical processes to reduce the number of overlapping data reviews.

As you know, Sea Power 21 defines the capabilities and processes that the 21<sup>st</sup> century Navy will deliver. My objectives in recapitalization and transformation of the Navy and its infrastructure to achieve this vision have not changed since my appearance before this committee on 10 February 2004. If confirmed, I intend to continue our pursuit of distributed and networked solutions that could revolutionize our capability. We will focus in particular on the power of Sea Basing and our complementary capability and alignment with our number one joint partner, the United States Marine Corps. We will also continue our *Sea Enterprise* efforts to revolutionize the way in which our defense dollars are spent. We are committed to efficiency and productivity improvements that will generate the savings necessary to augment our investment stream and implement our Sea Power 21 vision.

## **Transformation**

**If confirmed, you would continue to play an important role in the process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats.**

**With the benefit of almost four years in office, please discuss the progress that the Navy has made in achieving its transformation objectives.**

A. When I became CNO, I established my "Top 5 Priorities" - Manpower, Current Readiness, Future Readiness, Quality of Service, and Alignment. In 2000, we were facing challenges and opportunities in each of these critical areas. We needed to recruit and retain the highly skilled, professional workforce of the future. We needed to invest in current readiness so our Navy would be able to project decisive power around the world, around the clock. We needed a vision to guide us in the 21st Century. We needed to continue to take care of our Sailors and their families and provide a quality of work worthy of their important service. And we needed to ensure that our organizations, systems, and processes were aligned to deliver exactly what they were designed to produce - a combat-capable Navy, ready to sail into harm's way.

The following is a breakdown of our significant accomplishments in each of those areas:

**I. MANPOWER.** This is, and will remain, our Navy's biggest challenge. As I have written elsewhere in this document, we are in the process of developing a Human Capital Strategy that makes sense for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We would not be in a position to do that today had we not first tackled the fundamentals of winning the battle for people: recruiting the right people, raising retention and attacking attrition. We have built a mentoring culture, emphasized our commitment to diversity, and piloted personnel programs to capitalize on the revolution we have inspired in training and detailing. In short, we now have the highest quality workforce the Navy has ever seen.

- **Recruiting.** We have consistently met or exceeded our recruiting goals since 2000. In fact, I have approved a reduction of 17,000 people in our recruiting goals since I have been CNO, and I'm not convinced that we've reduced enough. The reason is we are now retaining 62 percent of Sailors with less than six years of service. This, in turn, has allowed us to seek out higher quality recruits than ever before. Nearly fifteen percent of our current recruits, for example, now have some college experience, up by more than 300 percent since FY00. More than 95 percent of new recruits

have high school diplomas, up from 90 percent in FY01. And minority officer applications increased by 27 percent while minority Seaman to Admiral-21 applications increased by 15 percent.

- **Retention.** We have experienced extraordinary retention in our Navy fostered by a new culture of choice and a focus on professional development for our Sailors. This new culture has led to the highest retention in our history and this fact has resulted in what I like to call a *virtuous cycle* in manpower. We are not only able to be more selective in recruiting, but we are also able to establish the kind of competitive environment for reenlistment and detailing that we need to change the shape of the force, developing a more educated and experienced group of professionals to lead and manage our high-tech Navy. To that end, we have grown the percentage of E-4s through E-9s (Top 6) to 73.25 through the FY05 budget submission, moving well toward our goal of 75.5 percent by FY07. Sailors in many ratings have been given new opportunities to compete and grow in our institution through adjusted NEC-targeted Sailor Reenlistment Bonuses and the Perform To Serve program. We have also piloted choice in assignments with a new geographic incentive pay pilot program. Sailors are now able to compete for select jobs in duty stations across the globe.
- **Attrition.** Since FY00, we have reduced attrition by 33 percent. Our losses due to illegal drug use are also down, while we increased drug testing by 12 percent.

**II. CURRENT READINESS.** As I said in my confirmation hearing four years ago, I believe that we have a responsibility to you in the Congress and to the taxpayers to ensure that the Navy the nation has already bought is properly provided for. That is at the root of why we have invested billions of dollars in training, maintenance, spare parts, ordnance, flying hours and steaming days so that the current force is prepared on a day-to-day basis to deliver persistent combat power whenever and wherever it is needed. The Fleet has answered the call by producing the best readiness levels I've seen in my career, and the combat-ready response of more than half the Navy to recent operations worldwide has provided ample demonstration of that fact.

- **Surged combat excellence to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.** Seven aircraft carriers and nine big deck amphibious ships were among the 164 U.S. Navy ships to deploy worldwide in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Along with our number one joint

partner, the United States Marine Corps, we put more than 60,000 combat-ready Marines ashore in Kuwait in 30 days. And the Military Sealift Command sailed and chartered more than 210 ships and moved more than 32 million square feet of combat cargo and more than one billion gallons of fuel, or 94 percent of the nation's joint and combined capability to the fight.

- **Implemented a new Global Concept of Operations.** To enhance our Navy's ability to respond to crises whenever and wherever needed, we have implemented a Global Concept of Operations that increases both the number and capabilities of naval assets that are forward deployed throughout the world. This new operating concept delivers a sustainable global reach to influence current events through the sovereign presence of our naval forces.
- **Developed the Fleet Response Plan (FRP).** The Fleet Response Plan is a revolutionary new approach to Operational availability for our Navy and greatly enhances the ability to surge naval forces if required by the President. The FRP and the supporting Integrated Readiness Capability Assessment (IRCA) will enable us to surge 50 percent more combat power on short notice to deal with future global contingencies.
- **Sustained the war against terrorists.** We expanded our littoral warfare capabilities by realigning our Naval Coastal Warfare forces, establishing Mobile Security Force detachments, adding an Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit to NAVCENT and accelerating the planning for two new SEAL teams.
- **Created Expeditionary Strike Groups.** We enhanced our strike capability with creation of Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). The Expeditionary Strike Group combines the combat power of the Marine Expeditionary Unit with the strike and Air Combat capabilities of Cruiser and Destroyer escorts to create a transformational capability in littoral warfare.
- **Improved organizational, intermediate and depot maintenance for our ships, submarines and aircraft.** Innovative programs like SHIPMAIN and the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP) helped develop and share best practices, streamline maintenance planning and improved performance goals in shipyards, depots and other maintenance facilities.
- **Aligned our Homeland Security organization and improved our force protection procedures.** We established COMUSNAVNORTH,

activated the Atlantic and Pacific Shipping Control Centers, and created the Naval Air Station North Island Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Test Bed under the Commander, Navy Region Southwest, to exploit technology and move new AT/FP capabilities into the Navy.

**III. FUTURE READINESS.** At the Naval War College in June 2002, I introduced our vision of tomorrow's Navy, **Sea Power 21**, and this vision committed us to change. It began the process of translating theory into practice for a wide range of advanced concepts and technologies that will dramatically increase the combat effectiveness of the joint force. While we must continue to challenge our assumptions, I believe that recent operations around the world indicate that we are on the right vector.

- **Sea Strike.** We introduced capabilities that extended our reach and precision, providing joint force commanders with a potent mix of weapons. For the first time, we deployed F/A-18E/F Super Hornet squadrons, providing greatly enhanced range, payload, and refueling capability to forces in OIF. The Shared Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP), the Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (AT-FLIR), the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System and the Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) arrived in the Fleet and showed us the power of these new knowledge dominance technologies. And we began the conversion of the first of four Trident SSBNs into the SSGN conventional strike and SOF platform.
- **Sea Shield.** During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Navy helped extend the defensive umbrella over joint forces ashore. USS HIGGINS (DDG 76) provided early warning and tracking to help U.S. Army Patriot batteries defend Kuwait and southern Iraq from the threat of theater ballistic missiles. Also, USS LAKE ERIE (CG 70) and USS RUSSELL (DDG 59) combined to acquire, track and hit a ballistic test target missile in space with an SM-3 developmental missile in support of the Ballistic Missile Defense program. These missile tests are contributing to an initial Ballistic Missile Defense capability that will become part of our navy's ability to respond to emerging threats. And we have formed Task Force ASW to study improvements in ASW readiness, enhance our capability, and ensure access for joint forces moving from the sea to objectives inland. Task Force HIP POCKET demonstrated dramatically improved close-in defensive systems for surface ships in the near-littoral environment.
- **Sea Basing.** We awarded three preliminary design contracts

for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), leading to the construction of the first LCS in FY05. We selected the baseline design for the DD(X) multi-mission destroyer, launched SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) and VIRGINIA (SSN 774) and began fabrication of MAKIN ISLAND (LHD 8). The Defense Science Board study on Sea Basing, our Joint Forcible Entry study and the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) Analysis of Alternatives now nearing completion are all beginning to provide the information needed to define future sea based expeditionary operations. As our Sea Basing concept continues to unfold, we will develop a more detailed view of LHA(R) and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) which will shape our next budget submission in these areas.

- **FORCEnet.** FORCEnet is the connection between our initiatives to integrate the power of warriors, sensors, weapons, and platforms into a networked combat force. For the first time, we have created a single organization to establish an enterprise-wide architecture that puts in place standards for both infrastructure management and the networking of combat systems. We have also enhanced joint and coalition interoperability on all of our deploying ships through installation of CENTRIX and COWAN nets. We also partnered with the U.S. Army to develop a joint, ISR airborne replacement for the aging EP-3.
- **Sea Trial.** Sea Trail streamlined and formalized our experimentation process and is up and running with the Fleet in charge. Sea Trial is already providing us with valuable insights into future tactics and technology. As an example, two high-speed, wave-piercing catamarans (HSVs) were employed as part of a joint-service experiment. HSV X1, known as JOINT VENTURE, conducted operations this past year in support of mine warfare and special operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. HSV 2, known as SWIFT, is conducting experimentation in support of Sea Power 21 concept development. These ships are an experimental bridge to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and their tests will help mitigate the risk of the LCS program while further enhancing our understanding of the near-land domain.
- **Sea Enterprise.** As we pursue efficiencies and overall effectiveness, we are running the business end of the Navy to redirect resources towards creation of tomorrow's Navy. We have focused headquarters leadership on outputs and execution and we are creating ideas that will improve our productivity

and reduce our overhead costs. The Sea Enterprise (SE) Board of Directors established an enterprise-wide approach to transformation, validating \$38B in savings across the FY04 future years defense plan and identifying \$12B in new initiatives to help us recapitalize and transform the force.

**IV. QUALITY OF SERVICE.** Quality of Service is a balanced combination of quality of life and quality of work. Our goal and commitment is a Navy that provides good quality of life and work for our Sailors and their families. We will continue to fund technologies and develop programs that enable our people to do their jobs more effectively.

- **Continuing Investment in our Sailors.** Sailors are the core resource of the Navy and we compete with industry to retain them. Investing in Quality of Service is critical in this effort. Congressional commitment to redress pay imbalances relative to the civilian sector have allowed competitive base-pay raises and the completion of the DoD goal to eliminate out of pocket expenses for housing (by FY05). Additionally, we have funded achievement of Homeport Ashore, moving all single sea-duty Sailors to Bachelor Quarters by FY08.
- **Family focused programs.** Quality of Service has also been enhanced for the families of our Sailors. We have improved family housing and remain on track to eliminate inadequate family housing units by FY07. Family medical care benefits have been enhanced through the initiation of TRICARE for Life, ensuring superb medical care for qualified families after their military service. Finally, traditional difficulties with military service have been mitigated through partnerships with private industry to provide mobile career opportunities and enhance the Spouse Employment Assistance Program.
- **Accelerating the Revolution in Training and Education.** Training and education for our Sailors are a critical component of their Quality of Service and we have created a developmental system to accelerate the implementation of training and education improvements that has become a model for DoD. These programs seek to create the workforce for the 21<sup>st</sup> century and to ensure the right skills, in the right place, at the right time. Education opportunities have also been enhanced through the Navy College Program, including partnerships with civilian colleges, to provide rating-

related associate and bachelor degrees via distance learning.

**V. ALIGNMENT.** At its most fundamental level, alignment within our Navy is about two things. First, it ensures that organizations, systems and processes are constructed to effectively and efficiently produce a combat-ready Fleet geared to fight as part of the joint force. Alignment is also about effective communication, ensuring that we share a common understanding of the mission and objectives, and that we speak one message with many voices across the entire organization. Over the last four years, we have launched numerous initiatives aimed at increasing the alignment of our organization.

- **Reorganized the OPNAV Staff.** We established the Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7), thereby significantly enhancing the integration of platform and network requirements, and resource planning and programming. And we refocused the mission of the Deputy CNO for Fleet Readiness and Logistics.
- **Reorganized the Fleet.** We created the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) to integrate policies and requirements for manning, equipping and training all Fleet units. We created Fleet Type Commanders to lead their communities with one voice, from the waterfront. We established the Naval Network Warfare Command as a single organization responsible for network, space and information operations. We organized the Naval Construction Battalions into a single Division. We also established the Commander, Navy Education and Training Command to serve as the Chief Learning Officer for the Navy and to be the single authority for individual training (officer and enlisted) strategy and policy. We aligned the Navy Warfare Development Command and warfare centers of excellence under CFFC to stimulate concept development and technology insertion to the Fleet. And, we established the Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNI) to better guide the operations, administration and support for Navy installations world-wide while reducing infrastructure management layers.
- **Improved our alignment for joint warfare.** We joined with the Marine Corps to integrate USN-USMC logistics functions, capabilities, and processes, and we implemented the Navy-Marine Corps TACAIR integration plan. We also issued the Transformation Roadmap to specify the capabilities required to increase joint warfighting effectiveness. We invested in

the U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Integrated Systems Program, new munitions development with the U.S. Air Force, and joint experiments with the U.S. Army on high-speed vessels.

### **What are your goals regarding transformation in the future?**

A. My beliefs about the future boil down to this: success in the world that we are moving toward will demand two attributes above all others -- speed and agility. This is true regardless of whether we're talking about combat or the size and adaptability of our industrial base. It is the demand for speed and agility that drives much of our thinking about the following transformation goals:

- **Develop new concepts of operation and the systems that support them.** We have to get to the fight faster and we have to seize and retain the initiative once there. That means increasing the operational availability of our forces by continuing to refine and test the Fleet Response Plan and its associated training and maintenance processes. That means studying our base structure to ensure that we are in a position to win. And it also means that we have to do what we can to lighten the load of joint forces going ashore and reduce our ground footprint. To that end, we must more fully develop the operational concepts and tools required for seabasing, pervasive awareness in the battlespace and the delivery of precision, seabased fires to support forces ashore. Some of those tools include the Littoral Combat Ship and modular combat systems, ACS, an all-electric drive DD(X) and the continuing development of the electromagnetic rail gun, JSF, organic mine warfare, unmanned air/surface/subsurface vehicles, air and ballistic missile defense, and stealth in our ships and aircraft.
- **Leverage potential changes in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future).** Minimizing dependence on foreign bases and the need to establish a beachhead for projection of power ashore, we will use the maneuver space of the sea to usher in dramatic new ways of employing joint forces to deter conflict, wage war and restore stability. In that regard, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I have initiated an analysis of alternatives to determine how best to leverage potential changes in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) in order to generate a more responsive amphibious capability; one that will deliver combat power faster and with more lethality.

- **Enhance interdependence with our joint partners.** Speed and agility apply as well to the way in which we run the business of putting combat power to sea. In that vein, we have initiated efforts to achieve true integration, even interdependence with our joint partners. We have initiated a Spiral Development process to increase return on our initial investments and to reduce the risks associated with technological advancements. And we need to look hard at right sizing the industrial base to build the military capability we need for the right kind of fast and agile Navy of the future.
- **Ensure our ability to operate in all elements of the unique maritime domain.** It has become increasingly clear that we must have a Navy that can operate in two very different strategic environments; we must maintain our readiness to win decisively against an enemy at sea, but we must also be able to operate effectively in the littoral environment required by the Global War on Terrorism. Transformational technologies such as the Littoral Combat Ship and Unmanned Vehicles, among many others, will employ spiral development techniques for future and evolving technologies that will ensure our ability to operate in all elements of the unique maritime domain.
- **Refine our infrastructure requirements and level of manning.**  
As we evolve our concepts for employment of forces, this will allow refinement of our infrastructure requirements to include the appropriate number of ships, aircraft and submarines. We will continue to refine concepts such as Sea-Swap, and we will continue to experiment with multiple crews for various platforms to not only define how many assets are required, but how much structure is needed to create and sustain them and what level of manning is required.

In sum, if confirmed, my goals for transformation would be to expand upon our asymmetric advantages, speeding our process of innovation and driving the co-evolution of concepts, technologies and doctrine.

## **Fleet Response Plan**

**The Fleet Response Plan has been implemented to provide a surge capability to provide “presence with a purpose.” There have been some reports that indicate dissatisfaction with the unpredictability of the new deployment schedules.**

**What strengths and weaknesses have you perceived to date with the implementation of the Fleet Response Plan?**

A. FRP formalizes a surge capability we have always had, and streamlines our maintenance and training processes in order to enable progressive readiness in the fleet. The principal strength of the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is that it will allow us to surge 50 percent more combat power on short notice whenever the nation needs our naval forces to arrive with overpowering force. This is being accomplished largely within resources already planned, with no increase in OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. While the timing and sequence of underway time may shift, the total amount of underway time is not increasing. The end result is that we derive significantly more return on the nation’s investment in naval forces.

FRP also attempts to maintain the readiness state of naval forces at a higher level throughout the course of the employment cycle, thus increasing the operational availability of the force. To do this, we have fundamentally reconfigured our employment policy, fleet maintenance, deployment preparations and fleet manning policies to expand the operational availability of non-deployed fleet units. We have shifted the readiness cycle from one centered solely on the next-scheduled-deployment to one focused on returning ships to the right level of readiness for both surge and deployed operations. In short, we have been seeking to instill a “culture of readiness” throughout the Fleet so that our adversaries can no longer count on our predictability in how and when our forces will be employed. This added flexibility and adaptability is an important part of confronting new threats and giving the President options as we prosecute the Global War on Terrorism.

FRP is in its first full year of execution and, while we are working to identify areas of the plan that require refinement, no noteworthy weaknesses have been identified to date. “Summer Pulse 04” is the first exercise of FRP, and will culminate in simultaneous deployment of seven CSGs operating in five theaters with other U.S., allied and coalition military forces.

**Are there sufficient assets to support the “6 plus 2” surge of Carrier Strike Groups, particularly since there are only 10 active airwings to deploy on the 12 aircraft**

**carriers?**

A. The FRP 27-month employment cycle allows us to sustain eight Carrier Strike Groups in 'surge ready' status. For a number of years, we have operated with 12 aircraft carriers and 10 airwings. Type Wing Commanders prudently schedule airwing aircraft depot-level maintenance periods prior to and during their Inter Deployment Readiness Cycle to ensure adequate assets are available for training and deployment. Nominally, two aircraft carriers are in extended maintenance periods at any time. By rotating airwings to available aircraft carriers the "6 plus 2" commitment is met.

**After a surge, do you feel there is sufficient maintenance and repair capability in the public and private sector to quickly reconstitute the force?**

A. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we surged seven Carrier Battle Groups, four Amphibious Readiness Groups, and two Amphibious Task Forces; more than half the fleet. That force was reconstituted using both public and private ship depot repair facilities. All the ships that participated in OIF have been reconstituted and are back in their notional maintenance schedule. Should another surge be ordered, there is sufficient repair capability and capacity to reconstitute the fleet and reestablish notional maintenance rotations.

**How does "presence with a purpose" differ from other concepts such as "virtual presence"?**

A. "Virtual presence" refers to the fact that some military assets of the United States need not be deployed to a theater of operations in order to be employed for combat. In theory, therefore, these assets are always virtually present in the minds of friends and potential enemies alike. That said, "virtual presence" is actual absence, and absent forces cannot engage with allies or demonstrate commitment in peacetime, nor can they generate persistent combat power and operational agility in war. The "virtual presence" of strategic weapons and space-based assets is complementary with, not a substitute for forces deployed overseas.

"Presence with a purpose" is a term that I've used to describe moving beyond rigid six-month, heel-to-toe rotational deployments based on the calendar rather than on the accomplishment of specific missions. It is the surge capability provided by the FRP that makes possible this reexamination of the definition of global presence. It's about capitalizing on the tremendous investments that we've made in training and

maintenance, building a culture of readiness, and generating the responsiveness of our forces required for victory in a new era where time is the friend of our enemy. And then it is about maximizing the effect of our presence, both in real-world operations and in exercises. I believe that to win quickly and at minimum cost, we must arrive early and with the right set of capabilities. "Presence with a purpose" helps us to do that.

## **Vision for the future**

**In your Sea Power 21 vision for the Navy, you have put forward a notional force structure that you have publicly stated would translate into a requirement for approximately 375 ships. Yet recent documentation from the Defense Department endorsed a shipbuilding rate that would maintain, at most, a 300 ship Navy. In the past, Navy officials have been consistent in testimony that “quantity has a quality all its own.” Additionally, you have been quoted in the papers as indicating that the 375 ship number may not be that important.**

**Has anything changed that would alter your previous stated requirement for approximately 375 ships?**

A. We are continuously studying and updating the analysis that supports this number. Like all analysis, that which supports a Navy of approximately 375 ships is based upon assumptions about technology and about how we use technology to generate warfighting capabilities. For example, our estimates of the range, payload and sensor envelope for future unmanned vehicles will generate a notional number needed to develop some percentage of sensor coverage over a given area. In turn, the number of unmanned vehicles that can be carried, launched and/or controlled by a single ship may vary depending upon radio frequency band and bandwidth requirements, operator requirements and the physical capacity of the ship itself. From this example, it's easy to see that a small change in any one of these variables will have an impact on the outcome of the total ship number analysis.

Add to that new operating concepts like Sea Swap, with which we are experimenting now, and the variables in the analysis may change again. Sea Swap has the potential to increase the operational availability of our platforms for forward presence and for surge operations without extending the deployments of our Sailors. This could also modify our investment approach.

We will continue to assess the impact of new technology and new operating concepts as we work to transform our Navy. Now and in the future the challenge will be to balance risk and an affordable fleet on the one hand with the global defense needs of the nation on the other. If new analysis supports a different number of ships, then you will hear it from me first.

**Do you still envision a force of 12 Carrier Strike Groups and 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups?**

A. Yes, but as I discussed above, new technology and new

concepts of operation may change our analysis of what is needed.

**What effect have current operations had on your vision?**

A. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were the most joint operations in our history and they have provided the best possible opportunity to dissect, study and analyze some of the limiting factors and effects of how we fight. And while we recognize that we must continue to challenge all of our assumptions in a variety of scenarios, our lessons learned indicate that the capabilities-based investment strategies, new war fighting concepts, and enabling technologies we are pursuing in our Sea Power 21 vision are on the right vector.

These operations proved - more than anything else - the value of the combat readiness in which the nation has invested, and the importance we must place on improving the fleet's ability to respond and surge with decisive, persistent combat power. They demonstrated the importance of the latest technology in surveillance, command and control, and persistent attack. Sensors and precision weaponry are changing everything we know about the balance between firepower and maneuver in a battlespace defined increasingly by time and information rather than distance and geography. In this environment, time critical targets will increasingly be the norm rather than the exception, and the speed of action will demand that we deal more effectively with the doctrinal problems associated with fratricide. Our operations over the last few years have also highlighted once again that over-flight and basing overseas are not guaranteed; our dominance of the maritime domain and our consequent ability to quickly deliver an agile combat force is a priceless advantage for our nation.

## Attack Submarine Force Levels

**The most recent official statement of requirements for attack submarine force levels was a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fiscal year 1999. That study indicated that the minimum requirement for attack submarines is 55 boats, and that in the future the Navy would need to have between 68 and 72 boats. A substantial portion of these numbers of boats were deemed necessary to meet various intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. There have been recent press reports that the Navy is considering reducing the force structure of attack submarines to fewer than 40 boats, a significant reduction from any of these levels.**

**What are the considerations that might permit the Navy to conclude that a number of attack submarines substantially smaller than 55 would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?**

A. The reported studies recently alluded to in the press are Navy internal efforts that are continuously conducted. No definitive submarine force structure has been determined. Navy, JCS, and OSD are conducting a submarine force structure assessment that will conclude later this year.

In considering whether the minimum attack submarine force-level requirement of 55 should be reduced, it is important for studies and analyses to evaluate the range of options and potential performance versus the risk associated with those options and the trade-offs between competing platform investments. We have a responsibility to balance all of our warfighting investments to deliver the full range of naval capabilities. Over the past four years, we have made tough decisions to reduce the total number of surface combatants and tactical aircraft based on this kind of analysis. Submarines are, and will continue to be, part of the calculus in determining how best to deliver the capabilities the nation requires of its Navy.

A thorough analysis of the required number of submarines should consider the potential duration of future conflicts and subsequent threat draw down rates, the value of precursor actions and distributed sensors, possible changes in threat numbers and capabilities, changes in the environment or theater of operations, changes in strategy and tactics, inherent differences in capabilities of platforms, forward basing and optional crew rotation versus supportable infrastructure, political climate, and vulnerability of the forward basing to weather, threat of attack and other variables.

## **Joint Forces Command**

### **In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Joint Forces Command?**

A. As the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Joint Experimentation, Joint Forces Command is responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for creating and refining future warfighting concepts and integrating service efforts in support of the Joint Vision. They coordinate and collaborate with the Joint Staff, services, Combatant Commanders and various Defense Agencies to ensure concept development and experimentation is conducted in a common joint context to support the Secretary of Defense Transformation Planning Guidance and CJCS Joint Vision Implementation Plan.

### **What role should Joint Forces Command play in experimentation, acquisition, and exercise planning and execution?**

A. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) coordinates with the services to integrate experimentation as well as joint concept and prototype development. They should continue to develop and define the joint context for experimentation and their Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan. This will help synchronize experimentation and assessment events to refine joint concepts and doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) to realize desired joint capabilities.

Through continued co-sponsorship of service war games and collective assessment of these games and other events such as exercises, studies, Advanced Technology Demonstrations and real-world operations, JFCOM will provide a cohesive joint operational concept development environment. At the same time, they should ensure each event supports individual Service objectives as well as broader Department of Defense transformation goals.

JFCOM's role in the acquisition process should remain to inform the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process through findings from the conduct of joint experimentation. The identification and development of transformational warfighting capabilities through experimentation events that reveal potential material solutions should be forwarded to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for consideration and implementation in the JCIDS analysis process.

## **United States Naval Academy**

**In the National Defense Authorization Act for 2003, increases of 100 per year in the end strength of the U.S. Naval Academy were authorized up to a limit of 4,400, however, the Navy has indicated that it does not intend to increase the size of the Brigade of Midshipmen to 4,400.**

**What is your view of the optimal size of the Brigade of Midshipmen?**

A. Due to exceptional officer retention and current plans to decrease end strength in FY05, I have given guidance to target 4,150 students in FY05. The optimal size of the Brigade varies from year to year and is dependent on a number of factors including retention levels, fleet billet requirements, and overall end strength goals.

**Do you support increasing the number of midshipmen to 4,400 and, if not, why not?**

A. I support authorization to have up to 4,400 students at the U.S. Naval Academy and request continuing authorization to operate up to the 4,400 student level. The number of students however is adjusted year by year in accordance with the dynamics of our overall accession requirements and our end strength goals.

**For several years, the Naval Academy has included in its faculty Permanent Military Professors, career officers who instruct at the Academy until mandatory retirement.**

**What is your view of the appropriate number of Permanent Military Professors at the Naval Academy?**

A. Permanent Military Professors are of great value to the U.S. Naval Academy. We agree with the pending legislative proposal to increase the number of Permanent Military Professors (PMPs) to 50 and to exempt these officers from grade control and strength limits. This has been a recurring recommendation of the Board of Visitors. These officers typically fill technical disciplines while pursuing doctoral studies in a related area (e.g., physics, electrical engineering, and weapons systems development).

**If you believe more are needed, what is the Navy's time line for providing additional Permanent Military Professors?**

A. If legislation is approved, we would seek support up to 50 PMPs at the Naval Academy in FY05.

## **Navy End Strength**

**The Navy's proposed budget for FY 2005 includes reductions of 7,500 personnel in the active duty ranks and 2,500 in the Naval Reserve. You have stated that your goal is to reduce the Navy's active duty force to 350,000 sailors from the current authorized level of 373,800.**

**What is the justification for these reductions in active duty and Naval Reserve forces?**

A. Our end strength goals are part of a long-term plan to maximize the capability of our people while minimizing the total number in the manpower account. As I testified to earlier this year, I believe that retaining manpower we do not truly need limits the potential of our people. I also believe that it severely limits the investments needed to transform our combat capability for the future, an area in which we have underinvested by \$90 to \$100 billion in the decade of the '90s. Add to that the fact that my buying power has decreased with each passing year, and the conclusion that we must become more effective and efficient with the resources provided us is inescapable. This is why, if confirmed, the first item on my agenda will be the development of a Human Capital Strategy that makes sense for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Navy.

We must come to grips with the fact that we will need to compete in the all-volunteer marketplace for bright, talented and ambitious Americans to operate the ever more technologically complex Navy of tomorrow. Our workforce as a whole must be better trained in high-tech skills and more educated to use those skills wisely. These sophisticated young people are in demand, and we will have to pay them enough to be competitive with other employers and to reward them for their increasingly critical contribution to the defense of our nation. We must also be able to offer them the kind of job content that will appeal to their sense of accomplishment and satisfaction.

Achieving a viable human capital strategy will not be possible unless we attack the problems inherent in our current manpower approach, which I believe is an unaffordable outgrowth of a conscription reality that no longer exists. The total costs of manpower have increased 40 percent since I have been CNO. A change in course for the workforce will be driven by our changing the nature of the work, and by changing the way in which we access, develop and retain these marvelous Americans. We have a lot of work to do here, and we have begun to address this challenge by introducing new technology and new processes to the Fleet and to our shore facilities, such as Optimal Manning and

the establishment of the Navy Installations Command, that reduce manpower needs.

Our analysis indicates that based on technology insertion and innovation, we can potentially reduce our manpower structure to nearly 350,000, and we will continue to study if additional reductions would be practical or desirable.

## **Prevention and Response to Sexual Assaults**

**On February 25, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Personnel conducted a hearing on policies and programs of the Department of Defense for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault in the Armed Services at which a “zero tolerance” standard was endorsed by the service vice chiefs. In late April 2004, the DoD Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault issued its report and recommendations, noting “If the Department of Defense is to provide a responsive system to address sexual assault, it must be a top-down program with emphasis placed at the highest levels within the Department down to the lowest levels of command leadership. It must develop performance metrics and establish an evaluative framework for regular review and quality improvement.”**

**In response to the report and recommendations of the DoD Task Force report, what actions are you taking to improve the Navy’s prevention of sexual assaults?**

A. Sexual assault is not tolerated in our Navy. Our standard is that every Sailor be treated with dignity and respect. When incidents do occur, we have a process in place to provide specialized assistance to the victim, to conduct a full and fair investigation, and to hold offenders accountable. The senior leadership of the Navy has personally communicated to each commanding officer our expectations regarding Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) responsibilities and reporting compliance. We require annual training on sexual assault awareness and prevention. Training is included in the student curricula at RTC Great Lakes, the Naval Academy, NAS Pensacola, and is presented to prospective Commanding Officers and Executive Officers, to Surface Warfare Officer classes, and at the Senior Enlisted Academy. I have also asked the Chief of Naval Personnel to initiate an internal monthly review of sexual assault data to identify trends and propose corrective action where required.

**Does the Navy’s Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program have sufficient resources?**

A. Yes, and we are continually evaluating resource requirements. Accordingly, we have allocated additional funding for the remainder of FY 04 and for FY 05 to further enhance program services and to offset increasing costs.

**What actions, if any, do you plan to take to improve the Navy’s ability to respond to the needs of victims of sexual assault?**

A. We have what I believe to be effective policies in place in the areas of awareness, prevention education, and victim advocacy. To improve our ability to execute those policies, we

have focused commanding officer attention on the issue, we have committed the additional funding noted above, and we are working to develop better performance metrics in our data collection and trend analysis.

## **National Security Personnel System**

**In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of the Navy stated that the Navy will be the first component of the Department of Defense to implement the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) enacted by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.**

**If confirmed, what role would you play in implementation of the NSPS for civilian personnel in the Navy?**

A. If I am confirmed my role would be to incorporate the legislated personnel management system into our larger institutional strategy for capturing the genius of our people, both military and civilian. I will also implement and integrate the civilian workforce into our 21st century workforce to ensure continued readiness of our Navy while seeking out efficiencies to minimize overall cost. I believe NSPS must be a central element of any Human Capital Strategy that we develop to recruit, access, train and manage our workforce.

What I like most about this legislation is that it authorizes a more flexible civilian personnel management system, allowing DoD to be a more competitive and progressive employer at a time when our national security demands a highly responsive system of civilian personnel management. At the same time, it also ensures that merit systems principles govern changes in personnel management, that whistleblowers are protected, that discrimination and nepotism remain illegal, and that veterans' preference is protected. This will facilitate the kind of competition and performance we need for the future.

Most importantly, I believe we will also need these kinds of flexible authorities and incentive tools to shape the career paths and our skills mix in a way that lets us compete for the right talent in uniform, not just within the Navy, but with all the nation's employers as well.

**What are the fundamental principles that you would apply in managing personnel reform of this magnitude?**

A. Four fundamental principles will guide the management of this personnel reform. First, we will seek to create a workforce that maintains our Navy's *readiness*. Second, we will seek to maintain a *flexibility* that will enable us to tap into the efficiencies that ensure we are good stewards of our budget. Third, we will continue to be a *merit-based* organization that seeks to deepen the growth and development of our workforce. Finally, our organization will demand a *safe, fair, and*

*respectful working environment* that respects the fundamental dignity of our workforce.

**You testified that the enactment of the NSPS system would enable the Navy to shift functions now performed by the uniformed military to civilian employees of the Department of the Navy.**

**What is the status of the Navy's efforts to shift functions previously performed by the uniformed military to civilian employees of the Department of the Navy?**

A. I have established an office of Civilian Community Management, similar to that which we have used for military community management, under my Deputy for Manpower and Personnel. That office is currently evaluating the work performed and the skills required in our civilian workforce as a necessary prerequisite to a determination of how best to transfer military functions to civilian and contract personnel.

## **Navy-Marine Corps Intranet**

### **What is your assessment of the status of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet program and the ability of that program to meet the Navy's information technology needs?**

Let me say first that I believe that the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is vitally important to both the US Navy and the US Marine Corps; it is the foundation upon which we are connecting our force and our people, and it is moving forward.

There are a number of complex challenges that remain including ongoing standardization of existing hardware and software systems, countering the cost spiral of emerging technologies, maintaining system efficiencies across the enterprise in light of these new technologies, maintaining information assurance on a large-scale system, and long-term integration with other knowledge management systems.

These are complex and highly dynamic problems, but Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation is already providing NMCI services to more than 360,000 users in the Navy and Marine Corps, which makes NMCI the second-largest computer network in the world -- only the Internet itself is larger. NMCI is providing an increasing user base with much better information assurance and security. We also have four world-class Network Operation Centers (NOCs), 27 unclassified server farms and six classified server farms up and running. This "backbone" has successfully maintained service through fires, floods, blackouts, and hurricanes. What the DoN/EDS partnership has accomplished is significant and improves on a daily basis.

We are committed to NMCI and to bringing the entire department onto a single, secure, enterprise-wide intranet. The immediate challenges are rapid completion of the "cutover" of NMCI seats on the NMCI network, improved user acceptance of the inherent changes, and "harvesting" the benefits offered by NMCI (e.g., business process change and improved productivity).

## **TRICARE**

**Your support for the TRICARE program has been notable throughout your military service, particularly as the Chief of Naval Operations.**

**What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the military health benefit, its administration through TRICARE, and the sufficiency of funding for military health benefits by the Department of Defense?**

A. The military health benefit is among the finest available, as evidenced by the continued enrollment growth of our beneficiaries and its identification in survey data as one of the strongest retention incentives among active duty naval personnel. Naval Medicine effectively managed the military health benefit during a period of benefit expansion and enrollment growth, while keeping medical inflation below the national average. The new TRICARE contracts provided sweeping improvements in the provision of TRICARE benefits this fiscal year. While there will be no significant benefit changes, it simplifies the old contracts, and provides performance incentives and guarantees. It is important to allow the military health benefit to mature under the new contract. Any future modifications should incorporate readiness, equity, affordability, and be competitive with the private sector. Naval Medicine is funded at the level supported in the President's Budget, benchmarked at FY02 baseline levels.

## **Space Programs**

### **What role should the Navy play in space programs?**

A. While the United States Air Force is Executive Agent for space programs, we remain engaged in the Department of Defense management structure for these programs, including requirements development, science and technology, research and development, acquisition and, wherever appropriate, operations.

### **Should the Navy principally be involved in the exploitation of data and services provided by space assets, or should the Navy be engaged in the development and operation of space systems?**

A. The Navy is engaged across the board and supports the Air Force role as Executive Agent. The services have been charged by the Secretary of Defense to educate, train, develop and sustain a cadre of highly competent and motivated military and civilian space professionals. The Navy space cadre, with their experience in naval warfighting, are valuable participants in the requirements, science and technology, research and development, acquisition and operation processes. They are in a position to put maritime needs into the space context, and suggest innovative approaches to best satisfy joint requirements.

### **If the latter, what is the appropriate level of that involvement in development and operation of the space system?**

A. Ensuring maritime applications of space programs are being executed by the Air Force is an important consideration, and we therefore cooperate with our joint partners to ensure appropriate joint development that incorporates capabilities to operate in the unique maritime environment.

## **Ballistic Missile Defense**

**The Navy will play an important role in defending the nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats.**

**Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?**

A. As I testified to this committee last year, I accept ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission. We have been working with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to help deploy this important capability for the nation. Navy systems and tests have shown great promise in recent years. Indeed, our SM-3 missile has hit the target four out of five times in the past 18 months. I initiated and fully support the ongoing agreement between Navy and the MDA that provides full-time commitment of an Aegis equipped Cruiser to the Testing and Evaluation (T&E) role, as well as a plan to modify other Aegis equipped ships to conduct MDA missions when required. We are intent on helping MDA succeed in deploying effective ballistic missile defenses.

**Should the Navy play a role in the defense against short and medium range ballistic missile threats?**

A. Yes. It wouldn't make sense if we don't capitalize upon the oceans and our dominance at sea in posturing to do this important mission. The Combatant Commanders are in the process of developing a joint concept of operations for ballistic missile defense against threats of the short and medium-range class. The Fleet and Navy headquarters staffs are actively engaged to ensure that Navy capability is utilized to best effect in both advance planning and deployment of SRBM/MRBM defenses.

**What plans does the Navy have for testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System?**

A. The Missile Defense Agency is currently charged with testing of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABMD) for the Defense Department. I have directed the Fleet to cooperate actively as MDA proceeds with their Testing and Evaluation program. Navy ships have been involved in every major system test for the past two years. Aside from the Navy-specific firing events featuring USS LAKE ERIE, Navy destroyers have participated in ICBM tracking exercises on a recurring basis. Under the direction of Fleet Forces Command, Navy Sailors have begun an aggressive training and exercise program in cooperation with our colleagues in the joint arena. We're resolved to be ready to go

when the President calls for the deployment of ballistic missile defenses and I'm pleased with our progress to date.

## **Science and Technology Program**

**The defense science and technology program is recovering after years of declining budgets. However, the budget request for defense S&T still falls short of the Secretary of Defense's goal of dedicating 3% of the total defense budget to science and technology. In particular, the Navy science and technology program, especially the investment in long-term, innovative work which has been so successful in confronting emerging threats, has declined significantly over the last three years.**

**How do you plan to address the shortfalls in the Navy science and technology program to meet the Secretary's goal?**

A. The fiscal year 2005 Navy S&T budget request stabilizes funding at zero percent real growth for the first time in three fiscal years, and though it is not 3% of Navy TOA, it does provide a sufficient level of investment in this very important program for this year. Three (3) percent remains our goal, but at the same time, we must recognize and balance competing investment priorities from year to year. We have done that in this year's budget, and I expect we will continue to do so in the years to come.

**What is your view of the role and value of science and technology programs in meeting the Navy's transformation roadmap goals?**

A. As I have said in previous testimony, I would count advanced technology as one of our national asymmetric advantages. Science and technology programs are therefore important in maintaining that advantage. In fact, much of the maturing technology being delivered today for incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and process improvements are the result of long-term investments in Science and Technology. That said, new technology alone will not deliver the Navy's transformation roadmap goals. It is only when we integrate that technology with new operational concepts and organizational constructs that it results in real transformation of military capability.

## **Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative**

**The Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI) is a package of legislative proposals requested by the Department of Defense in response to environmental encroachment on military readiness.**

**How have the three RRPI proposals which already have been clarified in law--the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)-- affected the Navy's test and training readiness?**

A. The amendments to the ESA, MMPA and MBTA enacted in the 2003 and 2004 NDAA made favorable changes that have improved the Navy's performance in both environmental stewardship and fleet training operations. Clarifying our current and future responsibilities and providing assurances that these standards will remain constant is helping us to plan and resource for stable, long-term programs that will benefit both fleet readiness and the land and life that abounds on and around our ranges. Specifically:

- Migratory Bird Treaty Act: FY03 NDAA allows the military to conduct training while protecting migratory birds, thereby preserving the availability of Farallon de Medinilla and other critical ranges for vital Navy training.
- Endangered Species Act: FY04 NDAA allows DoD to use the Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan (INRMP) prepared under the Sikes Act to address endangered species concerns in lieu of designating a critical habitat. It also required the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to consider the impact to national security when designating a critical habitat.
- Marine Mammal Protection Act: FY04 NDAA amended the MMPA definition of "harassment," adjusted the permitting system to better accommodate military readiness activities, and added a national defense exemption consistent with other environmental statutes.
  - "Harassment" now focuses on biologically significant vice benign disturbances, eliminating the legal tripwires of 'small numbers' and 'specific geographic area.'
  - Allows safety, practicality, and effectiveness of the military readiness activity to be considered for monitoring and mitigation measures.

We are grateful for the FY03 and FY04 NDAA changes which continue to be implemented. Preserving these changes in future reauthorization acts is important to us, allowing the Navy to continue to demonstrate the right balance between military readiness and environmental stewardship.

## **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

A.     Yes

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?**

A.     Yes

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Naval Operations?**

A.     Yes

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

A.     Yes